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# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

COMMENTS ON NFIP DISCUSSIONS WITH DEP SEC DEFENSE ON 11 JUL 86

FROM:

Dan Childs  
CIA Comptroller

EXTENSION

NO.

ER 86-3142X/1

DATE

15 Jul 86

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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### Language Incentive Program

The Agency's Language Incentive Program recognizes the critical importance of foreign language skills in the successful performance of our mission. The Program is designed to heighten employee awareness of and affirm Agency commitment to the essential importance of foreign language skills.

#### Types of Awards

- Use - This is where we put our greatest emphasis (and most money). It is paid to employees who occupy positions which require the use of a foreign language in support of the Agency's mission.
- Achievement - This award is designed to encourage the acquisition or improvement of foreign language capabilities. The award is not paid for language acquired prior to employment.
- Maintenance - This award encourages the retention of foreign language skills which the employee may use in a future assignment. The award is paid annually, provided the employee has a current test score on record.

#### Testing

All employees in the program are tested every three years and certified by skill and proficiency level to establish eligibility.

#### Payment

The amount of each award is determined by two factors: the difficulty of the language and the employee's proficiency level. Languages are divided into three groupings according to difficulty. Proficiency is established by Agency testers on a rating scale from 0 (no proficiency) to 5 (native ability).

STAT

#### Size of the Program

For FY 1986 the projected total cost of the program is  There are  participants.

STAT

#### Effectiveness

We significantly overhauled our program late in FY-85. While it is too early to claim unequivocal success, the increasing level of participation and achievement is very encouraging.

## LANGUAGE GROUPINGS BY DIFFICULTY

GROUP I

Afrikaans	French	Italian	Norwegian	Spanish
Danish	Haitian Creole	Lingala	Portuguese	Swahili
Dutch	Indonesian	Malay	Romanian	Swedish

GROUP II

Albanian	Estonian	Kachin	Polish	Thai
Amharic	Finnish	Kazakh	Russian	Turkish
Armenian	Georgian	Kirghiz	Serbo-Croatian	Turkmen
Azerbaydzani	German	Lao	Shan	Uighur
Bengali	Greek	Latvian	Slovak	Ukranian
Bulgarian	Hausa	Meo	Slovenian	Urdu
Burmese	Hebrew	Moldavian	Somali	Uzbek
Byelorussian	Hindustani	Mongolian	Tadzhik	Vietnamese
Cambodian	Hungarian	Nepali	Tagalog	
Czech	Icelandic	Persian	Tamil	

GROUP III

Arabic	Chinese	Japanese	Korean
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Sunday 13 July 1985

# Administration Mobilizes To Direct Aid to Rebels

*U.S. to Advise, Equip, Critique Contras*

By Joanne Omang  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Three weeks after the House vote that gave President Reagan nearly all he wanted to fight Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government, the relevant intelligence, military and diplomatic experts in official Washington are moving toward a kind of war-footing.

It is clear that the aid package for antigovernment rebels, known as contras or counterrevolutionaries, will involve far more money than the \$100 million voted by the House, far more people than the 20,000 fighters who will receive it, and far more monitoring and evaluation than either critics or supporters of the program like to acknowledge, according to administration and congressional officials.

Although surrogate troops and not U.S. Marines will spearhead the effort to make the Sandinistas "cry uncle," as Reagan once put it, the contras will be advised and informed, trained and equipped, criticized and evaluated by U.S. intelligence, military and political strategists.

A flurry of interagency meetings

and task force planning sessions has begun to give shape to the new program. As expected, it will be run by the Central Intelligence Agency. Army Col. William C. Comee Jr., who has just finished a year commanding U.S.-Honduran military exercises in Honduras, reportedly has been selected to become program coordinator, pending its Senate approval. Intelligence officials and congressional staff members are drafting financial accounting procedures in an effort to avoid the kind of controversy that has plagued previous contra aid programs.

The one-year goals and benchmarks by which the administration plans to judge progress will be critical to future debates over continued aid and over U.S. policy in Central America. The fruits of the new operation will also be an important factor in debate over the wisdom of the so-called Reagan doctrine that calls for support to rebellions against communist regimes around the globe.

If the new surge of aid to the contras is working, administration officials contend, these symptoms will

See CONTRAS, A16, Col. 1

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**CONTRAS, From A1**

be evident: escalated military activity throughout Nicaragua, possibly including attacks on the capital city of Managua; disciplined combat by the contras, with relatively few civilian casualties or human-rights complaints; rapid growth of the contra forces and a reinvigorated internal opposition, leading to "cracks" in the Sandinista leadership; and Soviet restraint in bolstering the Sandinistas.

If the military ambitions have been clearly delineated, the administration's political aspirations for the contras are more ambiguous. Reagan has never precisely stated what he means by "cry uncle." His chief of staff, Donald T. Regan, told television interviewers in April: "We have to get rid of it [the Sandinista regime] in some way or another. And what we want to do is to try to help those who are trying to overthrow that communist government, try to force it to have free elections. . . ." But other administration officials have articulated more modest ambitions.

One administration official said an expansion of civil rights in Nicaragua would signify U.S. success; but one of his deputies said that a totalitarian crackdown would mean the administration had succeeded in severely shaking the Sandinista regime.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz called the June 25 House vote "part of a long-term shift of view that's been taking place" nationwide. "We're seeing a growing breadth of support for the basic [administration] policy in Central America," he said.

But Reagan backers in Congress say the support depends very much on what happens next.

"The contras are on a very thin string with the U.S. Congress," said Mark Falcoff, a conservative Latin America scholar who recently joined the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff. "They are surrounded by people just waiting for them to fail so they can jump right

on top of them, and they know it."

Lawrence Pezzulo, ambassador to Nicaragua under President Jimmy Carter, spoke for many critics of Reagan's policy. "Nicaragua is in bad economic shape already, and this program will bring them to subsistence living, but they won't give in, at least not before the end of the Reagan administration," he said. "The use of U.S. troops will eventually be the only option left. . . . If you're a Democratic [presidential] hopeful, what else will you be talking about in the summer of 1987?"

To underscore that point, the aid package is expected to get heavy fire in coming weeks from Senate opponents, including some presidential aspirants, in the various committees that have jurisdiction over it. It may also be subject to a liberal filibuster when it reaches the Senate floor next month. But all sides say the House package will pass the Republican-dominated Senate virtually unchanged, if only because no one wants to go through another bruising House debate, which new amendments would trigger.

The package includes \$27 million for food, medicine, clothing and other nonlethal aid, \$3 million for the contras' human-rights office and \$70 million for military training and hardware.

Reagan has decided to return management of the program to the Central Intelligence Agency, with assistance from the Defense and State departments, according to State Department officials. They said aid will be channeled primarily through Honduras and Costa Rica, as it was in the past, with the covert cooperation of those two governments.

Reagan has pledged to spend only the \$100 million and to stay away from the CIA's contingency funds, which are considered all but unlimited. Another \$300 million in economic aid will be distributed by the Agency for International Development among El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Honduras.

A Senate Republican source said the \$100 million figure "reflected an assessment of what the political traffic would bear, not an assessment of what the requirements are." All sides assume a larger aid request will be made next spring.

**CONTRA FORCES, 1979-85**

(ESTIMATED TOTAL COMBATANTS)



SOURCE: U.S. Department of State

THE WASHINGTON POST

In an effort to avoid a repeat of congressional charges that the CIA overspent previous aid limits through creative bookkeeping when it ran the program before 1984, an intelligence agency task force has been meeting with congressional committee staff members for several weeks to agree on accounting methods, according to a House Democratic source.

The CIA, for example, has not in the past counted its agents' salary costs against aid allocations and did not count the expenses of the "mother ship" its Latin operatives used as a launch platform from which to mine Nicaraguan harbors in 1984, members of Congress complained at the time.

The source said intelligence-related reconnaissance flights over Nicaragua and Honduras, broadcast monitoring and decoding activity, all of which collect data routinely passed to the contras under existing law, have not been and probably will not be charged to the aid program. He was unable to estimate spending for those activities but said \$400 million

a year "is probably a low figure."

The task force will submit accounting guidelines for approval by the congressional intelligence committees that will monitor the overall program, another source close to the effort said.

"You can bet there's a major drive to avoid the kind of flap we had over the \$27 million," he added, referring to House committee charges—denied by the administration—that much of last year's non-lethal aid package had gone illegally to offshore bank accounts, obscure corporations and the Honduran armed forces.

House Intelligence Committee Chairman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) said he was worried about the committees' ability to monitor the new program. "We just don't have the staff for it, and I'm not sure the [Central Intelligence] Agency does either," he said.

Fred C. Ikle, undersecretary of defense for policy and a central decision-maker on Nicaragua-related matters, said in an interview that U.S. military spending against Nicaragua will be handled largely by the CIA and will go well beyond the \$70 million voted by the House.

That, he said, will buy training, primarily in guerrilla tactics, and military hardware ranging from surface-to-air missiles to bullets.

Intelligence work is expensive and outside that tally, but it "has to be directed at trouble spots, and Nicaragua is a trouble spot," he said. "But it is done for broader purposes" than just to help the contras.

In addition, "we are strengthening SOUTHCOM because that is a turbulent region, again because of Nicaragua," Ikle added, referring to the U.S. Southern Command headquarters in Panama.

Congressional watchdogs also expect the virtually nonstop military exercises in neighboring Honduras to be expanded while the new aid program is in effect, though they are not part of it. This is in part because Comee, named by military and State Department sources as the new overall coordinator, is a Vietnam veteran who commanded the Joint Task Force Bravo exercises during the past year.

Fluent in Spanish, Comee was instrumental in setting up the series of exercises that began in 1983 when

he was stationed at the U.S. Southern Command headquarters. The maneuvers have involved roughly 24,000 U.S. troops in 12 series of exercises since early 1983, according to Defense Department figures.

The first shipments of new military equipment, which can begin Sept. 1 pending the Senate vote, will probably include antiaircraft weaponry that will allow the contras to defend positions inside Nicaragua, the sources said.

The first sign things are going as planned, therefore, will be increased military attacks on Sandinista positions by contra forces "all over Nicaragua," a State Department official said.

Ikle predicted that the Soviet Union, which has supplied Nicaragua with an estimated \$750 million in military equipment since 1979, "will be much more cautious" in helping the Sandinistas now, "realizing from the American commitment that it is a losing game."

State Department officials said they think Soviet aid is not likely to increase in sophistication or quantity much beyond current levels, in

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which the peak is the Hind Mi-24 helicopter gunship that has routinely decimated contra forces. Recent shipments brought in an estimated 15 new Mi-17 transport helicopters, bringing the Sandinista helicopter fleet to about 40, Pentagon officials said.

The contras will not come close to matching those under the new aid program, but defensive weapons "will make it a more equal battle," one official said.

Ikle and other officials said no comprehensive battle plan or training program had yet been drawn up. William G. Walker, deputy assistant secretary of state for Central America, said one reason for that was old-fashioned superstition about the vote in Congress: Some refused to make plans "because they didn't want to jinx the deal."

SOUTHCOM commander Gen. John R. Galvin told a closed session of the House Appropriations subcommittee on military construction last March 12, long after Reagan proposed the \$100 million aid program, that he did not know how or where training might be conducted.

"None of this has been looked at. I haven't been told that we would do training, and nobody has asked me to go find out where," he said.


However, top training priority will be instruction in guerrilla warfare techniques, probably at the contras' clandestine camps in Honduras, including psychological operations aimed at winning over the Nicaraguan population, other sources close to the military effort said.

Some promising contras will be brought to officer training schools in the United States or Panama, the sources said.

If everything goes as well as the administration hopes, one year from now the contras "will be carrying out well-disciplined, coherent operations demonstrating . . . the effective destruction of targets without too much collateral damage," Ikle said.

The United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) leaders would like to capture and hold territory within Nicaragua, and that "would make a lot of difference politically if it can be done," but no one is pushing for it, Ikle said.

More important will be "the dynamic of the contra force, whether it is growing or losing people, whether they are knocking at the door to get in or quitting," Ikle continued. At 20,000 armed fighters,



the contras are already four times larger than the Sandinista force that overthrew dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979, but their leaders have said they would like to be 30,000 strong by next July.

"Within a year, we will be seeing cracks in the Sandinista structure," said Alfonso Robelo, one of the three top UNO leaders, at a recent news conference. He said that meant defections of troops or perhaps whole units, increased economic disorder, and a more openly hostile population.

Administration officials and their critics agree that the reaction of rank and file Nicaraguans to the renewed contra effort will be key to the future. Walker said the new aid would be "a great boost to the democratic resistance" within Nicaragua, which could produce internal disruption that would give heart to the contras and show the world all was not well under the Sandinistas.

Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, has said progress toward U.S. political goals in Nicaragua would be easy to monitor: "You can see if the press is free, if people can speak

out or hold rallies, or if the church is being harassed," he said.

Walker said the opposite situation might also be progress. "If the Sandinistas have to turn the screws down to silence the opposition, that will be an indication that things are going well" for the contras, he said.

More people will try to dodge the Sandinista draft or leave the country as refugees, and "if our policy is right, unity among the opposition should increase," Walker said.

In a year's time, the Sandinistas "should be able to see the outline of the opposition forces they face, and they will act accordingly," he continued.

"Eventually, if it is revealed to them that they are very unpopular, that there is no possibility of a military solution [eradicating the contras] and that their Soviet patrons would think twice or four times before coming to their assistance . . . then they just might think, 'Hey, maybe we do have to negotiate our way out of this.'"

Ikle predicted a simpler outcome. "Perhaps they won't change colors and become social democrats," he said, "but they might agree to change jobs."

Saturday 1st July NY Times

# C.I.A. IS ASSIGNED ROLE OF RUNNING CONTRA ACTIVITIES

## STATE DEPT. TO SET POLICY

### Increased Nicaragua Fighting Expected Once Congress Votes \$100 Million Aid

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 11 — The Reagan Administration has given the Central Intelligence Agency day-to-day responsibility for managing rebels' military operations against the Nicaraguan Government, Administration officials said today.

Increased fighting is expected once Congress completes approval of \$100 million in funds for the Nicaraguan insurgent forces, often called contras.

The officials said the State Department would have overall policy direction of the operations. They said William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, had promised Secretary of State George P. Shultz that any actions that might prove embarrassing if exposed would be cleared with the State Department.

#### Record Considered Mixed

Administration and Congressional officials say Mr. Casey's record in building an effective system for arming and training American-backed guerrilla forces in Nicaragua and elsewhere has been mixed. [Page 4.]

Many in Congress have been very critical of the C.I.A.'s earlier management of military operations in Nicaragua. In addition, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, an Indiana Democrat who is chairman of the Intelligence Committee, has been unhappy with the secrecy attached to C.I.A. operations.

By insuring that the State Department would be in charge of overall policy, the Administration hopes to be able to deflect the expected political criticism of C.I.A. involvement.

#### Mining Affair Recalled

"We can't have another mining of the harbors," a State Department official said, referring to a controversy spawned by the belated disclosure in April 1984 that C.I.A. agents had mined the Nicaraguan harbors of Corinto and Puerto Sandino without the explicit approval of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which was supposed to be informed of such actions.

The assigning of roles for handling the \$100 million expected to be approved by Congress by the end of the summer has underscored the long-

standing tensions in the Administration over the issue of United States involvement in Central America.

Some State Department officials would have liked the Defense Department to play a more direct role in helping to manage the expected expansion of the war, rather than relying so heavily on the C.I.A. But they said the Pentagon, except for assigning specialists to help the C.I.A. train the contras, resisted efforts to bring it into direction of the war.

"You're going to have a 30,000-man army," one State Department official said, referring to the expected expansion of the contras. "That is not a paramilitary operation. That's a military operation."

The contras are now said to have about 20,000 troops, not all of whom are trained.

Officials said Mr. Casey had made a determined case within the Administration to make sure that the C.I.A. was given the operational responsibility.

#### Casey Said to Want Role

"D.O.D. is scared," a State Department official said, referring to the Department of Defense. "They are scared politically that this might be politically very unpopular. Their view is let Casey have it."

"He is dying for it," the official continued. "If we can win, he can walk

away with an agency that is rehabilitated to the best days of the cold war, able to conduct wars and throw governments out."

A senior Pentagon official denied that his department was "scared" of becoming involved. "There is no question that this is a special activities, or covert operations, and the law is clear that the C.I.A. is set up to run these sort of things," he said.

He cited President Reagan's Executive Order 12333 of Dec. 4, 1981, which said the Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility "to insure implementation of special activities."

The House has approved a bill allocating \$100 million in aid to the anti-Sandinista forces, of which \$70 million is in military assistance and \$30 million in economic aid. The Republican-dominated Senate is expected to pass the bill this summer and send it to Mr. Reagan for his signature.

#### C.I.A. in Charge Before 1984

Before 1984, the C.I.A. was in overall charge of the covert war waged by the contras. But when Congress refused to provide additional military aid and instead approved only humanitarian assistance, it specifically took the operations in Nicaragua away from the C.I.A. As a result, the State Department set up a special office to administer the \$27 million in humanitarian aid to the rebels.

The new bill does not specify which agency should administer the funds, but it does say that the Secretary of

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State should be in overall control. This allows the C.I.A. to once again become operationally involved.

There has been no decision yet on what to do about administering the \$30 million in humanitarian economic aid, of which \$3 million has been assigned by the House to strengthen the contras' observance of human rights. Some State Department officials would like to administer the economic aid and thereby maintain much more direct leverage on the situation.

But a high-ranking State Department official said this week, "The State Department is not culturally adapted to running that kind of program."

#### **Antiaircraft Weapons Stressed**

Once the \$100 million bill becomes law, an Administration official said, it will be decided whether to have the C.I.A. run the entire program or perhaps to give the State Department responsibility for the \$3 million dealing with human rights.

The House bill set as one of its priorities the provision of equipment and supplies for defense against air attacks. The Nicaraguan Army has been relying increasingly on Soviet-supplied military helicopters to attack rebel units, which have complained of lacking weapons to shoot them down.

The bill also orders the President to inform Congress regularly about how the funds are being disbursed.

While Mr. Shultz will be in overall policy control of the Nicaragua opera-



United Press International

**Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, who has become the key policy watchdog over military operations in Nicaragua.**

tions, the actual responsibility will fall on Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, who has been heading the interagency committee on Nicaraguan affairs for the last several months, department officials said.

26,737

## C.I.A.'s Paramilitary Operations: The Record Since the 50's

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 11 — Until the mid-1970's, the Central Intelligence Agency had extensive capabilities for waging paramilitary operations, including warehouses full of arms and a network of secretly owned companies that could ship equipment around the world.

Much of that capability was dismantled as the agency largely abandoned covert operations after Con-

gressional investigations in 1975. The present Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey, has made rebuilding of the paramilitary program a top priority, according to Administration and Congressional officials.

In the 1960's and 1970's the agency's paramilitary operations took a variety of forms, ranging from delivery of arms to active direction of field operations. For instance, the C.I.A. built an army of Hmong tribesmen in Laos who fought in that country while American forces were committed to South Vietnam. In Guatemala, the agency engineered the coup in 1954 in which a small army of rebels ousted President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán.

In 1958 the agency became involved in training and advising rebels fighting President Sukarno in Indonesia. This effort included a C.I.A.-financed air force with C.I.A. pilots, one of whom was shot down after accidentally bombing a church and killing most of the congregation. Shortly afterward, the operation was ended.

In 1975 the agency was involved in an unsuccessful program of support for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and the National Front for the Liberation of An-

gola. Both lost the Angolan war, although the former group has continued to fight under Jonas Savimbi and is again the recipient of covert American aid funneled through the C.I.A.

The most spectacular failure of the agency's paramilitary operations came at the Bay of Pigs, when a C.I.A.-trained force of rebels was decisively defeated in their attempt to retake Cuba from Fidel Castro. The agency bore the brunt of the criticism for the Bay of Pigs, and many intelligence officers have argued ever since against involving the agency in paramilitary operations.

Stansfield Turner, President Carter's Director of Central Intelligence, said that in his view, the agency was best suited for paramilitary programs. "The Pentagon is just not good at doing anything stealthily," he said. "It's a very bad idea to put this in the Pentagon. It's just ill-equipped to do this."

That view is shared by Mr. Casey, who has been a forceful advocate both publicly and privately of the doctrine of supporting rebels who challenge Soviet-backed governments. Under Mr. Casey, the agency has initiated or expanded a range of covert programs, including support for insur-

gents in Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Nicaragua.

According to Administration and Congressional officials, Mr. Casey's record in building an effective system for arming and training American-backed guerrilla forces has been mixed.

In the initial phases of the covert program to aid the Nicaraguan rebels, for instance, the agency was embarrassed by the revelation that a contract employee had written a guerrilla manual that advocated assassinations.

Members of Congress of various ideological persuasions have also criticized the agency for inadequacies in the program to aid the Afghan rebels.

And some former Nicaraguan rebel commanders have complained that C.I.A. advisers refused to heed their complaints about corruption among the movement's leaders.

At times, Pentagon officials have sought to become more involved in the agency's paramilitary operations, but Administration officials say the C.I.A. has consistently defended its position of sole control over such operations.

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16 July 1986Soviet Options Regarding Iranian Victory Over Iraq

The Soviets, like we, are increasingly concerned about the prospects of an Iraqi defeat at the hands of Iran.

Other than reasserting their standing displeasure about the war and blaming Iran, on balance, for its prolongation, we have not seen them doing or planning anything very specific against this contingency.

[redacted] they expressed willingness to do more to inhibit the flow of arms from Soviet allies to Iran. But this doesn't amount to much.

25X1

Should an Iranian victory start to materialize, Soviet behavior will depend crucially on how events proceed. In the extreme scenarios -- a Shia regime in Baghdad and the Iranians threatening wider offensive action -- the Soviets would have extreme, and risky choices:

They could try to act as the savior of the Arabs, but this could involve the need to threaten and even use armed force on Iran's northern border and possible confrontation with the US later. The US could end up stronger in the Gulf and the Soviets more feared by everybody.

Should the Soviets shift to favoring Iran, the new regional power, they'd leave the Gulf to the US and might not end up with more influence in Iran.

The Soviets could do better if the Iranian victory did not look so farreaching, if it led to Saddam's fall but little more, and to a moderation of Iranian aims (because Khomeini would be appeased, a costly war could be ended, and Iran could then make political hay from its new position in the region). This "middling scenario" might give the Soviets the opportunity to play the role they would most desire: to be a regional peacemaker at little risk. They have some capability to do this:

Relations with both sides.

Ability to put military pressure on the region without acting in a threatening manner.

The US, like the Soviets, would like the Iran-Iraq war to end. But it is far from clear that US interests would profit from the Soviets becoming the peacekeeping superpower in the region, with or without US cooperation.

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